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Becoming One of the Culture
by
Sandra Gail Teichmann
Ethnographic research is story telling, is documentation of an event, and as in reading
novels, we may find ourselves or parts ofourselves within the text. There we may validate our ideas,
our theories, or we may come to some new way of thinking.
Ethnography is also a means of establishing community as teachers and students and
researchers read and understand themselves through each other's stories. This community is not
unlike the one which Walt Whitman wrote of at the end of the last century in Democratic Vistas.
Whitman concerned himself with a lack of common understanding and concern for others, those
other and different from ourselves. He felt that this "lack of a common skeleton, knitting all close"
(Whitman, 1979, p. 324), ifleft unattended, would forever serve to divide our nation, both morally
and artistically.
Community (i.e., democracy in the ideal) as written about by Whitman, would be inclusive
and not only lift masses out of wretched poverty and give them material well being and a "deceptive
superficial popular intellectuality" (Whitman, 1979, p. 326), but would be a vehicle toward "really
grand religious, moral, literary and aesthetic" (Whitman, 1979, p. 326) achievements. Realizing,
of course, that the community is made up of the individual, and himself highly valuing the ideal of
individual, Whitman was aware of the need to reconcile the two, which are innately contradictory,
and he saw the means to this reconciliation through the realization that independence is possible
only through a strong and cooperative consolidation. A means of coming to this reconciliation is
through literature, through the voices of individuals writing and speaking of themselves to readers ,
who read and understand themselves through the text ofothers. Community is established through
a common knowing or perhaps questioning, yet the individual is respected and valued and his or
her position furthered as the ingredient necessary for further knowing. In "A Song for Occupations ," (Whitman, 1979), Whitman cried out wanting to hear everyone and know the details of what
they knew.
The bread and cakes in the bakery .. . the white and red pork in the pork-store;
The milliner's ribbons ... the dressmaker's patterns ... the tea-table ... the homemade
sweetmeats;
The column of wants in the one-cent paper ... the news by telegraph ... the amusements and
operas and shows;
The cotton and woolen and linen you wear ... the money you make and spend;
Your room and bedroom .. . your piano-forte ... the stove and cookpans;
The house you live in ... the rent ... the other tenants ... the deposit in the savings-bank ...
the trade at the grocery, (p. 106)
Through knowing each other, knowing the details, the community becomes stronger and the
individual's identity clearer. If such a community is to develop in Whitman's broad view or in the
smaller interest of specific research projects, the voices of all persons are to be heard: the voices of
the teacher, the student, the reader, the researcher, and the interested onlooker. Such voices would
be unique and follow no pre-established conventions set up by those who would control the
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conversation either for their own purposes or for fear of separating and perhaps alienating this body
of knowledge from the still powerful positivistic world of experimental science.
Stephen M. North (1987), in The Making of Knowledge in Composition, defines the process
of ethnographic research as that of finding and entering the setting, collecting data, and identifying
and verifying themes. According to North, this process seems to be self-contained in that,
Things can never come to mean in quite the same way twice. So Ethnographic studies cannot
be verified by being "replicated," nor can their findings be tested against their power to
account for other people in other places or times. (p. 310)
As such, there is no need or reason for incorporating outside facts or theories into the ethnographic
study, which is one experience complete within itself. An ethnographic report, like a novel, is a little
world within itself, a world where the reader confronts reality as displayed by the ethnographic
researcher. On display are people, objects, personal growth, motivation, dialogue, and moods in a
physical setting. Events and complications, involving all of these details, work within real time.
Readers come to these ethnographic stories as they come to works of fiction, with a desire to
understand and gain perspective on their own lives. Likewise the authors and researchers of
ethnographic studies write the particular story they want to read including the particular aspect
of the self they want to look at. Through the safety and distance of the story, both researcher and
reader are able to confront themselves and their professional concerns.

It is neither the research methods used to gather experience data nor the interpretation and
analysis of the data that I question here. Rather, I question the practice of using an ethnographic
study for supporting or disproving existing schools of thought and the practice of doing specific and
extensive research of theories in the field for purposes of building and supporting a working
question prior to engaging in the already dangerously subjective act of documenting, interpreting,
and analyzing a single experience which cannot be repeated for purposes of verification. The
practice of ethnography or naturalistic study, though quite simple and straightforward, seems
often to be complicated, mixed in with and confused with the process of hermeneutical inquiry
which, though dialectical, is "bounded by textual evidence" (North, 1987, p. 120). On beginning the
ethnography, the practice in some circles is to write a "review ofliterature" much like that used in
experimental science.
Some established researchers in composition studies justify the "review of literature" as a
means of showing that one is in composition, as well as a means of uncovering and relating the ideas
relative to the proposed question. I, however, have serious concerns about the "reviewofliterature"
as used for either of these reasons. Ifthe review is used as a means of showing that one has the right,
the credentials, the appropriate language for entering into a process ofrelating a story, I am aghast.
This absolutely violates the right and the need that all voices be heard. Nevertheless the custom
is to encourage the ethnographer to identify a question and then gather together and discuss a bevy
of theories that relate to that question. In a naturalistic study, however, questions change through
the process of the study, so it seems most unnatural as well as impractical to enter the study with
a question which already has been thoroughly considered in relation to outside theories. If
ethnographic research is a study of just one culture at just one point in time of what value are the
findings of others in equally isolated studies? There might be a time for bringing together the
findings of other studies or the thoughts of other researchers for the purposes of thinking through
some possible connections, but at the beginning of the study and throughout it seems awkward,
almost as if the researcher were unsure of the ethnographic method as a means of examining her
subject matter. Perhaps that's just it. The researcher needs the review ofliterature to get herself
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going. She feels she needs a foundation (not unlike that used in experimentally controlled methods)
from which to justify her questions and the methods which would follow her questioning.
By referencing the authorities in the field, the author also shows her familiarity with them
and perhaps also her right to equal authority in her statements. And perhaps this is the means and
the language used by all those who would be researchers. But isn't the nature of qualitative and
natural research such that it is never set in concrete, never forever true as the quantitative research
of scientific experimental research tends to be or pretends to be? If qualitative research is by its
very nature and definition subject to fluctuation and variability, for what purpose does an author
make an effort to connect his or her findings with those of other qualitative researchers? This push
for referencing authority in the field would perhaps seem to be a holdover from the purely scientific
research reports where the nature of the inquiry and the factual findings demand that prior
research results in the field be referenced for purposes of confirming, questioning, and further
postulating toward the end of one truth. The purpose ofreferencing, then, in qualitative research
writing does not appear to be that of establishing validity in one's findings, which then leaves the
purpose simply that of establishing one's authority by means of association with those who
presently hold authority within the field.
My question now is exactly how can or how does mere association or rather mere statement
of association set one on an equal or similar plane of authority? I don't think this is possible. Just
because I read and understand Past-President Carter's peace plan for war-torn Yugoslavia, and
then quote what I have read in a paper I am writing, am I on equal footing with him? Am I not
pretending toward a very foolish position that may indeed be very precarious should anyone take
me seriously on my stance of authority by association? Wouldn't I be better placed in the field of
qualitative research both as a scholar and as an authority on the subject to slowly and surely and
subtly build my authority through my experience, my own documentation, and my own thorough
interpretation and analysis in a setting where I place myself honestly and openly as one among
those and what I research rather than one among those who research like me? This is, of course,
not to say that a researcher should not vigorously pursue and consider and value all work produced
by others in the area of her research. This is a natural act. The researcher, ifindeed in true pursuit
of knowledge, will naturally read and analyze all material relative to her area of inquiry, but the
information and details gained will be used for expanded knowledge rather than for the purpose
of narrowing or for, what seems to me, a rather garish display of this is who I've read; these are my
equals now; these are my friends and my colleagues; take us now as one in the same.
And yet, under pressure, I too have bowed to the expected "review ofliterature." In my own
ethnographic research projects I have laid out my theoretical underpinnings as defined by bits and
pieces from a variety of theorists. By doing so, I establish my credentials through my association
with established and acknowledged others. I talk about their theories in the common language of
their discipline and, by so doing, I have perhaps accepted David Bartholomae's (1985) theory that
persons, in order to be heard and respected, must learn to sound like the experts. And so, I have
made my bid to be heard by and accepted into the closed society of teachers and researchers. Though
I resist it, I have used the "review of literature" and the "rhetorical context" in the typical
researcher's move to quickly and easily find common ground and common understanding with other
researchers and from there to proceed with the conversation.
But what about the individuals within the culture of my research? What about Byron or
Angela? What if they had wanted to tell the story themselves, tell it directly without the use ofme
as their spokesperson? Probably neither of them could have entered into the conversation because
neither of them are in composition, or whatever discipline. Neither of them would have knowledge
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of Moffett or Brannon or Cixous or Elbow or Coles. Angela's voice might have been included
somewhere, included, within the text of an expert, as an example, as a detail of some learned thesis,
but never respected and heard as the story, the valid representation of the culture of which she has
intimate knowledge and is a part. What if!, in documenting and writing up the report, had refused
to comply with the generally accepted practice? The story of the culture of my inquiry probably
would not have been heard.
A second reason given for the practice of beginning an ethnographic study with a "review of
literature" is the idea that one enter the study with a question and with a thorough knowledge of
the theories related to that question which in turn will direct the methods of the study. Underlying
this need for a "review ofliterature" seems to be the misconception that the purpose of ethnographic
study is to work toward one universal truth. This search for truth seems, however, to be the venue
of experimental researchers, not that of the qualitative researchers. It is thus that I find myself
confused when ethnographic research models call for extensive building of theory before the act of
research and analysis, and further confused when the expectation is that such a study might be
thought to be an appropriate means by which knowledge about schools of thought can be supported
or disproved.
In "Forming Research Communities Among Naturalistic Researchers," Lucy McCormick
Calkins (1985) says that methods of research are ideally chosen "based on the researcher's
personality and belief system." This seems like a logical and common sense approach to this
business ofresearch. Yet,just as I question the "reviewofliterature," I wonder why there is a need
to begin and build the research out of the theories of other researchers while ignoring personal
beliefs. As Calkins says, some ethnographers or teacher-researchers (Graves, Pettigrew, Shaw,
Van Nostrand) have not, for exactly these reasons, "stood on the shoulders of others," have even
declared there are no such shoulders to stand on (pp. 133-134). These researchers have had the
courage to refuse to place their studies within a theoretical context and to declare that the work of
ethnography is "necessarily exploratory" (p. 134).
Ethnography produces theory that comes from the bottom up as it emerges from patterns in
the data, rather than from the top down as heavily influenced by the collected theories of others.
But at times it seems that Calkins is working against this common sense as she builds a case against
individual exploration to the point where she seems to espouse, for purposes of building community
among the researchers, naturalistic studies that are a constant interaction between practice,
research, and scholarship. She admits, however, to the real danger of illustrating preconceived
ideas rather than documenting patterns in data.
There would seem to be a case for reading other ethnographic studies for purposes of
communication with other researchers, but not for the purpose of building on and adding to the
existing canon of theory. Ethnographic studies are not written as proofs, but as stories that are
individual and unrelated. Calkins ( 1985) considers this possibility but doesn't concur. Rather, she
seems to jump into the camp that might say we need solid footing in theory, because (unsure of
ourselves) we are, after all, more than just teachers; we are real researchers.
While the practice of "standing on others' shoulders" may be appropriate and desirable to a
certain extent in some selected instances, I'm wondering if such widespread referencing doesn't
most often cloud the process of knowledge-making by taking the researcher's focus and the reader's
focus from the subject of the inquiry to the interpretative statements of others which most likely
have little or nothing to do with the reality of the culture and the subjects in the present time of the
current investigation. In other words, because qualitative research is not conducted under the
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strict environmental controls of quantitative research, there may or may not be a basis for
comparative statements. And ifit is true that qualitative research is hypothesis-generating, isn't
the researcher unnecessarily preempting the efforts of her inquiry by referencing current theory
in the process of presenting information as witnessed and inhibiting the possibility of creative new
thought?
The very nature of ethnographic research would seem to require a healthy respect for and
deference to the reader as co-researcher in the inquiry and thus not want to or need to rely on
confirmation or denial of established theory as a means of establishing author authority. The
researcher and the reader and the subjects are in the business of generating a hypothesis, and of
coming to some tentative conclusions for this one time, this one place of inquiry which may or may
not have anything to do with any other one time, one place inquiry. Conclusions corroborated by
the canon are not what is important in qualitative research. What is important is the here and now
which deserves absolute respect and full attention by all involved.
As I think back to what Stephen North (1987) has to say about ethnographic research, I
understand that there is a great deal of confusion in this emerging field ofcomposition studies about
what is and what isn't research, and since the model that seems to still hold power is that of scientific
research where absolute truths are the goal, it should be nowonderthatoutofinsecurityqualitative
research has taken on some of the methods of the familiar and accepted means of quantitative
inquiry.
In reading John Van Maanen (1988), "In Pursuit of Culture," it seems that once the culture
has been defined, then the ethnography will be written. According to Van Maanen, culture resides
in language (quotes from tapes), concepts (description and analysis), categories (analysis), practices
(descriptions), rules (listing), and beliefs (analysis). It is my idea, then, that by going to the study
of rhetoric one might find some support for ethnographic inquiry that is free of the trappings of
qualitative research. The way from classical rhetoric to ethnographic research may at first seem
great if not impossible. I will, however, try to briefly outline my thoughts which might make this
tentative connection.
Classical rhetoric seems to be more of an art than modern rhetoric in the sense that it is more
controlled in its search for truth. For Plato there is a transcendent truth, a private truth, to be
reached through the self in a process of inquiry. Aristotle also believed in a transcendent truth,
accessible through scientific methodology. Truth for Aristotle would seem, then, to be less private
and more public, but the method of inquiry was still directed toward a definable truth. For Plato,
rhetoric, in the form of dialectical examination (a process of question and answer), was the means
to transcendent truth. For Aristotle, rhetoric played the minor role of communicating the truth to
lay persons or of inquiring after unknown truths.
Like Aristotle and Plato, when employing rhetoric in its dialogic sense, Bakhtin ( 1973 trans./
1990) approaches truth through dialectical inquiry. But for Bakhtin the truth is unknown, or even
nonexistent, except for periods of temporary societal interactions. For Bakhtin the interaction of
individuals within a community creates not only the identity of the individuals, but also meaning.
Kenneth Burke (1945/1990), believing meaning to reside in personal interaction, approaches
meaning in a similar way through the drama of who, what, where, when, and why. Through the
writing ofBakhtin and Burke the identity of truth and meaning seems to move in the direction of
the unknown.
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For Friedrich Nietzsche (1979 trans./1990), the search for truth seems to be formally
replaced by a search for meaning, which seems to lie in the simple moment of being. Foucault and
Derrida (1969/1990) build on this transient moment of meaning as they consider the existence and
non-existence of the creators of text. For these two twentieth-century philosophers text, as the use
oflanguage, is a momentary statement of momentary existence, containing no meaning beyond the
words on the page. Replacing humanism with naturalism, the way is cleared for contemporary
rhetorical inquiry into reality as perceived and lived by minority groups marginalized by the
dominant white males for the last 2000-plus years ofrhetorical history. Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
(1988/1990) presents a rhetoric, a use oflanguage that is not so much a communication between a
writer and a reader, nor so much an inquiry into truth or meaning, as a use oflanguage as a whole
performance-nothing more. In this rhetoric there seems to be no concern for interaction or for
gaining knowledge. There is an emotional use of language, an energy contained within, locked
within its framework. This language use is so tightly bound that it is resilient like a rubber ball
and is delivered by the speaker with the intent of bouncing back as a whole unit undisturbed by any
audience contamination. This is a self-conscious rhetoric, insular, posturing, and defensive.
Cixous (1975/1990) and Kristeva (1979/1990) push rhetoric even further than Gates, push
it out of existence. They, in a denial of the male, in erasing the tradition of phallocentric language,
deny the possibility of rhetoric to the point where it does not exist, neither as a form of
communication, as a method of inquiry nor as a weapon of defense.
Confused by all these complexities, I go back to the rhetoric of Aristotle, based in the logical,
the political, the philosophical, and the psychological. Accepting that rhetoric is, as classically held,
concerned with persuasion, whether that of persuading another or of persuading the self, the means
to new knowledge, then, is perhaps through a complicated process of understanding the relationship between these four elements. For purposes of this discussion, the focus of the persuasion is
not important, rather the means of acquiring new knowledge that in its process will lead to further
investigation.
Interested, however, in the possibility that rhetoric might be about something other than
persuasion, I turn to a study oflanguage and thought and meaning as these elements relate to the
work of a researcher. I am interested in the use oflanguage as a means toward new meaning and
new understanding. I am not so interested in the persuasive power oflanguage, which seems to be
the common and traditional definition of rhetoric. I, in fact, perhaps rebelling against the ever
growing powers of advertising and mass media, have a particular aversion to the use ofrhetoric for
purposes of persuasion. Whenever I hear reference to persuasive writing, I get images of Norman
Rockwell-like pigtailed door-to-door saleschildren holding out Girl Scout cookies; or Californiabeautiful hair blowing in the wind in a Breck television commercial; or letter-perfect smoothly
empty essays written by undergraduate and, yes, graduate students in marketing and city planning
courses; or love fantasies sure to come true with the scent of Obsession drifting from even now The
N ew Yorker; or D.C.-haggard statesmen delivering last-ditch campaign speeches; or, of course, not
to be forgotten, the hip-slick used car salesman. When I turn to the study of rhetoric, I do so not
wanting to learn to be persuasive to become a crook or a new-product representative or to make a
fool out of other human beings and myself, but rather to understand the use oflanguage as a means
of exploring the world around me.
As I struggle through a reading of Plato's (1914 trans./1990)Phaedrus, I think about how our
society honors a fine story told by a confident and polished writer, perhaps because it is easy,
because it takes us readers quickly to some dreamed-of paradise without much, if any, struggle or
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pain. I think about how, in writing fiction, students are often taught to "hook" the reader in the first
paragraph and then to get the momentum rolling so the reader has no chance of getting out, that
is, persuade the reader that he or she has to become a part of the action, as the author works to
eliminate all space between the sentences where the reader's own thoughts or the reader's
participation might take off on its own. And I think about how the same smoothness was taught
and expected in the traditional formal expository academic essay: present the thesis, let the reader
know what to expect, and then tell the reader what she expects with absolutely adequate support
to the point of conclusion, the neat package tightly sealed, and writer and reader so pleased and
proud and full of authority that they think they now know the absolutely final word on the subject
because they have written or read the perfectly definitive document, which of course makes obsolete
all previous documents and thoughts on the subject.

It seems to me that there might be more to writing, more to reading, more to researching and
documenting than bamboozling or being bamboozled. I suspect that rhetoric might be a place to look
into the potential oflanguage as a means of acquiring knowledge. I hope to find out more about what
I have had glimpses of through my own research, reading, writing, and, I guess, intuition. I have
hopes of gaining an understanding of the use oflanguage as a tool for world and self exploration as
well as hopes for finding a means of defending my sometimes peculiar ideas and practices in the
classroom and at my writing desk.
Going back to Aristotle, then, the means to new knowledge include the use oflogic, politics,
philosophy, and psychology. These four elements, through their sometimes complementary and
sometimes conflicting natures as they overlap with each other, create the marvelous atmosphere
of ambiguity which makes the act of communication, oral or written, the intriguing subject of
investigation ofrhetoricians and ethnographers that it is. Investigation then becomes a rhetorical
analysis of the communication between a researcher, a reader, and the subject.
A researcher involved in a search for meaning (new or existing) engages in a logical process
of thinking that is appropriate to the subject and the kind of meaning desired, and a logical process
that can be understood by the reader. The researcher working with this element of the process is
engaged in solving a problem and takes steps that are perhaps linear and orderly for purposes of
efficiency so that steps can be retraced and/or expanded. In a process of communicating meaning,
plagued by complexity and ambiguity, the use of logic is a stabilizing line to grab hold of in the
confusion.
But before the order oflogic can be laid out philosophical questioning contributes to, as well
as confuses, possible facts that might be placed in some temporary order. This philosophical
questioning which examines ideas and opinions, giving meaning to the subject under investigation
is the art of the dialectics and perhaps the means to new understanding of or new meaning for the
subject under consideration.
A researcher then becomes aware of the social circumstances of the subject of the inquiry,
the reader of the communication and, of course, the social circumstances from which she writes or
speaks. A researcher's awareness of the political aspects of the investigation are necessary for
survival. The success of the communication, the survival ofa researcher's idea, self-confidence, or
continued investigation of a subject may be very much at the mercy of the prevailing social powers
and communities.
The matter of psychology is employed by the researcher in her artful attempt to understand
both the subject and the reader through attitudes, emotions, and prior knowledge. The use of
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psychology may become a means of allowing space for the reader to participate in the process of
investigation.
Seemingly understanding the conflict and the rich possibilities inherent in and among these
four elements (logic, politics, philosophy, and psychology) ofan investigation, Friedrich Nietzsche's
( 1979 trans./1990) "On Truth and Lies in a N onmoral Sense" takes the focus of writing offof the push
for an absolute truth as he considers the human need to be in control of others, the need to be in
control and hold "the truth." As Nietzsche sees rhetoric, in its analytic faculty, as the basis of
philosophy, the possibilities, when the classical sense of power and persuasion are removed, turn
toward that of the dialectical, which is of course a means of investigating the truth in any field, any
discipline, on any subject. Get rid of the need for a sense of authority in writing, which is typical
of the academic way in most, if not all, disciplines, and the way would perhaps be open to learning
rather than possessing.
The pride connected with knowing and sensing lies like a blinding fog over the eyes and
senses of men, thus deceiving them concerning the value of existence. (Nietzsche, 1979
trans./1990, p. 889)
And so we come to the use of qualitative methods for purposes of gathering details for
documenting the culture of our interest. Through tape-recorded evidence of community
proceedings, taped conversations between individuals, photographs, member writings,
participant-observer statements, field notes, and journal notes, we can hope to make a valid
representation of the experience of our time within a selected culture.
Despite all the conflicts, the idea that research is or can be a practice of wondering seems to
remain constant, as I hold to my belief that research, like writing, is a means toward change when
practiced in great abundance in the form of trying out new ideas, of getting beyond what we already
know and who we already are or were.
And so it is that in these times of pluralism and multiculturalism I think that ethnographic
research is perhaps a means of coming to an understanding of ourselves. As we move into the next
century and as the writing of our research seems to be written and read with ever more attention
to social and cultural context, the intersection ofrhetoric and the process of ethnographic research
interests me as I work to become one of the culture ofmy inquiry, where what is important is the
here and now of the experience.
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